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Abstract. Emerging indoor positioning and WiFi infrastructure enable
building apps with numerous Location-based Services (LBS) that repre-
sent critical threats to smartphone users’ location privacy provoking con-
tinuous tracking, profiling and unauthorized identification. Currently, the
app eco-system relies on permission-based access control, which is proven
ineffective at controlling how third party apps and/or library developers
use and share users’ data. In this paper we present the design, deploy-
ment and evaluation of PL-Protector, a location privacy-enhancing mid-
dleware, which through a caching technique minimises the interaction
and data collection from wireless access points, content distributors and
location providers. PL-Protector also provides a new series of control
settings and privacy rules over both, the information and control flows
between sources and sinks, to prevent user information disclosure during
LBS queries. We implement PL-Protector on Android 6, and conduct ex-
periments with real apps from five different categories of location-based
services such as instant messaging and navigation. Experiments demon-
strate acceptable delay overheads (lower than 22 milliseconds) within
practical limits; hence, our middleware is practical, secure and efficient
for location-demanding apps.
Keywords: Location Privacy, Location-based Services, Smartphones,
Caching, Location-based Applications, Android, Mobile Platforms
1 Introduction
The explosive growth of Internet of Things, Smart Cities and Smart-
Home application frameworks, e.g., Samsung SmartThing [24] and Google
Weave/Android of Things [13], leverage third party developers to build
apps that compute on user’s sensitive data. For instance, emergent context-
aware mobile apps bring about tremendous opportunities for a whole new
class of Location-Based Services (LBS) [22]. Geo-marketing and geo-social
networking, location-based games, and assisted eHealth represent a small
subset of these opportunities that can certainly pose a serious threat to
the users’ privacy [18, 25].
Currently, privacy settings of user location on smartphones1 are mod-
eled after existing permission controls that are based on a binary process2.
In general, apps use permission-based access control for data sources and
sinks, but they do not control flows between the authorised sources and
sinks. Besides, users are forced to rely on third party service providers/sinks
that in many cases continuously collect, use and share their location data,
and in some cases even prompt the user to give away their position on
page load [1, 25]. Moreover, both academia and industry agree on the
urgent need of adopting a Privacy-by-Design (PbD) approach for the de-
velopment of more user-friendly and socially-accepted solutions to privacy
preservation on their mobile products and services [7].
To encounter this challenge, our approach campaigns new design prin-
ciple and privacy policy recommendation that forces the smartphone app
ecosystem to make location data use patterns explicit, while preventing all
other sensitive data flows. In this paper, we present the design, deploy-
ment and evaluation of the middleware called Private Location Protec-
tor (PL-Protector), which implements the LP-Cache´ model introduced in
[21]. PL-Protector envisions beyond the simple grant/deny access method
and provides the user with advanced mechanisms to decide the extent
of disclosing location data with service providers. It also incorporates
caching technique to determine users’ geographical location in a privacy
preserving manner by means of wireless access points, and with minimum
cache storage requirements. The contributions of this work are as follows:
– To identify the required functionality goals that protect users from
location-demanding apps through the analysis of location privacy spe-
cific challenges and security design issues within the existing mobile
platforms.
– Design of the on-device location computation model that enables ro-
bust and efficient source to sink (unauthorised apps and third party
app providers) flow control. We present implementation details of the
PL-Protector middleware for mobile platforms. Our prototype runs
on a Nexus 6p with Android that acts as platform’s location privacy
knob. PL-Protector only requires process isolation and IPC services
1 Throughout this paper, we use the terms Smartphone and Mobile interchangeably
2 Data protection directives and acts [9, 16] across the globe state that personal data
should not be disclosed or shared with third parties without consent from subject(s).
Such a consent is typically obtained by mandatory acceptance of the conditions men-
tioned in the End User License Agreement (EULA), or through opt-out possibilities
and other regulations[17].
from the underlying operative system (OS); thus, minimizing the re-
quirements placed on the hardware/OS.
– Evaluation of PL-Protector in terms of Quality of Service (QoS),
communication and computational overheads. We ported five real
location-based apps to PL-Protector. Macro-benchmarks of these apps
(latency) and our empirical settings indicate that PL-Protector per-
formance overheads are acceptable, and it is practical, secure, and
efficient middleware for location-demanding apps.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the back-
ground and related work. Section 3 overviews PL-Protector’s privacy
model. Section 4 fully elaborates on the design decisions, architecture
and implementation of the middleware. We evaluate PL-Protector’s per-
formance overheads in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes and sets
future plans.
2 Background
In this section we analyze the location privacy threats within the smart-
phone app ecosystem. This includes studying how the location calculation
process works in smartphones and how LBS apps collect the user loca-
tion data. We also justify our decision on implementing PL-Protector as
middleware for Android platforms. Nonetheless, our results can be ex-
trapolated to other permission-based mobile platforms such as iOS.
2.1 Location Sources
To understand location privacy specific challenges and security design is-
sues, we start analysing the process of location calculation in smartphones
when using LBS. Based on our prior study [21], we understand that the
three major existing mobile platforms, namely Android, Windows and
iOS that span the domains of smartphones, follow common patterns of
location data retrieval. Basically, the standard architecture of using LBS
on a mobile platform comprises of four main entities: 1) User Device i.e.
installed apps, 2) App Provider, 3) Network Infrastructure, and 4) Lo-
cation Provider. The user device collects the unique identifiers from the
surrounding network access points along with GPS data, and sends these
over to the location provider to get the exact device location. Calcula-
tion3 of the user device’s actual position is then performed at the location
3 i.e., WiFi Triangulation and Cell-tower Triangulation, GPS Mapping, etc.
provider who sends it back to the user device in the shape of a location
object containing geo-coordinates. At the device, this location object is
shared amongst apps, and then, it is transmitted to app providers along
with LBS query via the standard programming interface/API [3].
Simple eavesdropping on this location object is a major threat to
this architecture even if users put in place the corresponding location
sharing preferences4, which generally are highly context sensitive and use
dependent [27]. Moreover, existing OS’s location access controls by system
services respond inadequately to major privacy threats [1, 11].
2.2 Operating System Controls and Apps’ Location Access
In Android, apps can only access sensitive resources through the official
APIs once the corresponding permissions declared at the manifest files
are granted and authorised by the user. Since Android 6.0 (API level
23), users grant permissions to apps while the app is running, not when
they install the app. However, in both cases, a positive user authorisation
might result in other remote third parties and external sources benefit-
ing from this information made available in ad-libraries for commercial
purposes and/or untrusted code execution [8, 10]. These existing studies
and reports of data-stealing malware on smartphones clearly show the
need of a better run-time permission method regulating the way apps
and ad libraries are integrated into Android and other permission based
platforms.
2.3 Middleware
Privacy Enhancing Techniques (PETs) and other cryptographic schemes
[20, 26] have been proposed to the location query formation and privacy
preservation between the app/LBS providers in the different architectures
and settings. Besides, several proposals apply caching scheme, along with
PETs, to address location privacy challenges. Most of these techniques,
however, rely on a series of theoretical assumptions such as the existence of
a trusted infrastructure providing privacy protection, a group of similar
app users being at the same time and same place, or a data collection
servers complying with location privacy regulations, e.g., MobiCache´ [28],
[19] and [4], .
4 Types and levels of controls for user location privacy settings depend on the OS
and apps. In some cases, apps do not allow users to control others access to their
location data.
Cache´ [2] maintains an on-device cache to store entire location based
queries contents and data-types to be re-used in future LBS queries that
increases the cache storage requirements. Besides the storage overhead,
Cache´ also requires the abilities of app developer to modify the way app
access location data. PL-Protector only caches the network fingerprints
and mapped geo-coordinates, which reduces the memory requirements
significantly. Our middleware, PL-Protector, considers installed apps as
black boxes; this way, it does not require app developer to modify the
app code.
The service called Koi in [14] is cloud-based and demands numer-
ous changes in the existing smartphone ecosystem. It requires developers
to use a different API for the local access to the device location and
implements a comparison mechanism and location criteria. Similar to
ours, solution proposed in [12] does not rely neither on the adaptation
of the apps code nor on the existence of theoretically trusted infrastruc-
ture. However, it does not allow the user to control wireless and location
data that is shared with the location provider and/or the app provider.
This issue is mainly due to considering the location provider as the only
source of the user location when developing location-based apps. More-
over, it applies indistinguishability on the location data, which increases
the computational overhead over time. Additionally, MockDroid [5] re-
lies on instrumenting Android’s manifest permission mechanism to mock
sensitive data from OS resource, including location data, which can affect
apps’ usability and functionality. Our middleware not only monitors the
location sources but also modifies, if required, the generated location data
based on defined user permissions.
LP-Cache´ introduced in [21] and its implementation as the middle-
ware PL-Protector are, to our knowledge, first working prototype leading
the new design principles and policy recommendations to secure the com-
putation and transmission of user location data within the existing mobile
ecosystem. Main achievements lead to a minimisation of the wireless AP
data collection by both, the wireless content distributors and location
providers, and the provision of the control settings preventing user infor-
mation disclosure from the generated LBS queries (e.g., points of interests
(PoIs) and nearest neighbors).
3 Privacy Model
We characterize PL-Protector’s privacy model considering the threat model
and evaluation metrics for both app usage and privacy protection.
3.1 Threat Model
We consider two different threat scenarios to PL-Protector mainly caused
by the level of access to user location in and out the device, as follows:
Android’s Middleware Layer Threats A series of attacks operates at
Android’s middleware layer[6]. PL-Protector mitigates the location pri-
vacy attacks coming from over-privileged and malicious 3rd party apps
and libraries.
Privacy Threats User tracking, identification and profiling (i.e., per-
sonal habits, movement patterns, etc.) are fundamental threats to lo-
cation privacy [26]. Without PL-Protector, the continuous flow of LBS
queries between user devices and service providers, that include device’s
exact geo-coordinates information, leverages malicious misuse of the user
location data, especially in the presence of a malicious location provider,
app provider and via advanced network sniffing practices.
PL-Protector computes the exact location within the user device,
without the location provider’s involvement, whilst trusting the device
on the storage of sensitive data. However, the user has still the option of
giving consent for app providers and/or location providers to access loca-
tion data. Mobile network providers might, however, collect user location
data via cellular clients. It is also excluded from our work the option of
manually inserting the location data (e.g., street name and post code)
within the LBS query.
3.2 Preliminaries
We now model the user mobility and app usage (specifically at private
places) as a series of privacy evaluation metrics that will be used to vali-
date PL-Protector’s working assumptions.
Mobility Model We formulate users’ points of interests (PoIs), (e.g.,
Home or Work) as private places that users frequently visit. Hence, pi
represent ith private place identification, which is derived from a series
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Fig. 1. Mechanism to access user’s location in Android (left), and PL-Protector’s de-
ployment in Android (right).
of scanned beacons nx and the representative location lr for that private
place, and Pl is a set of user’s total private places, as shown in Eq. 1 and
2).
pi = [n1], [n2], ..., [nx]→ [lr] (1)
Pl = [pi], [pj ], ..., [pn] (2)
At location pi, the user can then visit a subset of private places Upi ⊆
p1, p2, · · · , pj , running the different LBS apps on his device. PL-Protector
relies on the user input to define the set of private places that are distinct
for every user mobility profile. Moreover, to set up network fingerprints
at pi, we measure the response rate as the ratio of detection count and
the total number of scans for each beacon as follows:
Rnc,x =
∑nc
i=1 bx,i
nc
, bx,i =
{
1 if beacon x found in ith scan
0 otherwise
(3)
where Rnc,x is the response rate of beacon x at pi and nc is the total
scan count since the private place was entered. The detection count of
each beacon is maintained to identify the frequently occurring beacons.
Beacons with higher response rate are used to create the network finger-
print for that pi. Rnc,x will be maintained in the PL-Protector database
to update the response rate of every detected beacon during a specified
time interval t spent at private place pi .
App-Usage Model We will apply privacy rules to the app sessions tak-
ing place at private places. We define “app session” as the duration of
the app usage. In Android, according to the execution status, an app
can run in three different states: foreground, background and perceptible.
In general, apps get access to the user’s location in foreground. When
the user exits an app, this is cached and moved to background state
for faster execution. Persistent status is informed by notifications. Back-
ground state allows prolonged location access; therefore, tracking threats
are more harmful here.
3.3 Privacy Metrics
Table 1 compiles the hereinafter metrics to be used for evaluating the
location privacy threats. We define value of Pls as the identifier of ap-
plied privacy setting and measure the achieved privacy by analysing the
collected dataset of the actual location traces at user’s private places.
To evaluate location privacy, we use Haversine formula in [23] to quan-
tify tracking and profiling threats as the distance Pld (Eq. 4) between
two positions with longitude and latitude (φ, λ) and the radius r of the
Earth:
Pld = 2r sin
−1(
√
sin2(
φ1− φ2)
2
+ cos(φ1) cos(φ2) sin2(
λ2− λ1
2
)) (4)
where the haversine function is given by Hsin(θ) = sin2( θ2), φ1 & φ2
are the original geo-coordinates, and λ1 & λ2 are the observed geo-
coordinates. Secondly, the privacy rules (see more details in Section 4.1)
pre-set by user will, later, be used to measure achieved privacy using the
distance scale 〈Phigh, Pmedium, Plow〉.
4 PL-Protector on Android
In this section we describe the architecture and implementation decisions
for PL-Protector middleware on Android.
Table 1. The evaluation metrics for the location privacy threats.
Metric Description
Pls Unique value to identify applied privacy settings
Pld Distance between two points with longitude and latitude
Phigh Distance is > 111.32km
Pmedium Distance is > 11.132km
Plow Distance is > 1.1132km
Fig. 2. User Interface: (left) WiFi settings screen, and (middle and right) screens to
manage per-app/location rule settings
4.1 Architecture
PL-Protector enables users to control per-location access sessions.
App-Session Handler component is responsible of intercepting location
access events so to lead the LBS apps’ control flow to our middleware.
It first pauses the requesting app and, retrieves the newly acquired loca-
tion object to be sent to the Private Location Manager component for
rule checking. Once the privacy policy rules are applied, the App-Session
Handler will receive the anonymised/transformed location and resume
the requesting app’s control flow.
The Private Location Manager is the central component that receives
both events (actions) and data from the different components as well
as it maintains the Cache DB database. User inputs via user interface
(UI) are used to create privacy rules for specific private locations and
network fingerprints. Moreover, the Private Location Manager detects
unique identifiers of the surrounding wireless APs and maintains a binary
flag to detect private places. When the flag is ON, the location data is
retrieved from the Cache DB and sent to the Policy Controller. In case
of an unmatched query on the cached locations, and the user do not want
to input geo-coordinates manually (via maps provided in UI) the location
data is received by location providers from the Location Receiver.
The Policy Controller gathers the location objects from the Private
Location Manager as to apply the corresponding user permissions on the
location coordinates, altering them if needed, and transferring the pro-
cessed location to the App Session Handler module. The two privacy
policies that the User can set per-app/place basis are the Standard Pol-
icy and Per-location Policy (see Fig. 2), as follows:
1. The Standard Policy consists of three location settings as follow:
(a) The Behaviour Protection setting implements the geo-coordinate
obfuscation equation defined in [21] to generate transformed/ ob-
fuscated geo-coordinates (l′, l′g) for every app session. The be-
haviour protection level is defined by a scale (Low, Medium, and
High) that determines randomness of the obfuscation equation’s
parameters 〈s, θ, (l, lg)〉, where s is the scaling factor, θ is the
random rotation angle, and (l, lg) are the original coordinates.
(b) The Location Protection setting implements the geo-coordinate
truncation equation defined in [21] and follows a location granu-
larity scale like (Low, Medium, and High) to adjust the location
precision level for every app session.
(c) The Block/Fixed Location setting picks high behaviour and loca-
tion protection level by default and determines a constant value
of altered geo-coordinates for every app session.
2. The Per-location policy allows the User to apply standard policy set-
tings for each pre-marked private places that are displayed on the
map.
Once processed geo-coordinates (l′ l′g) that comply with pre-set privacy
rule are generated, we measure achieved level of privacy on per-session
basis using values of both Pld and Pls (as defined in Section 3.3).
The Location Receiver component receives a location object, which
includes the user device’s geo-coordinates from location providers, and
sends it over to the Private Location Manager for further processing.
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Fig. 3. PL-Protector’s overall computation latency caused at 34 distinct private places.
4.2 Middleware Implementation
PL-Protector orchestrates a mobile platform based location protection
service on Android to modify the location resource handling process. The
middleware communication requires process isolation and IPC services;
hence, minimising the requirements placed on hardware or OS modifica-
tions.
PL-Protector Life Cycle In Android, there are two methods to ac-
cess user’s location: 1) Location Manager Service (Old), and 2) Fused
Location Manager Service (New) that are part of Google Play Services.
However, both methods require the app to request a callback function
to get regular updates by registering a location listener. The app re-
ceives a new location object when a new location is available, the callback
function is invoked (Fig. 1 (left)). Modifying these two Google services
is complicated, but we make PL-Protector communicate with the loca-
tion requesting apps by intercepting the location object before it reaches
requesting apps (Fig. 1-(right)). One of the main task is to add a sys-
tem service, where the class belongs to the location APIs. Thus, the PL-
Protector’s service is placed in the android.location package, which
detects private locations via WiFi APs and can also be used by other
components when calling context. In Android, a context allows an app
to interact with the OS resources. Similar to [12], we add a static con-
text field to the location class, which will be populated when the app
is invoked; this enables PL-Protector to know which app is currently re-
questing the location object, and also communicate with the OS. Besides,
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Fig. 4. Apps communication overhead without (left) and with (right) PL-Protector.
Fused Location Manager combines sensors, GPS, Wi-Fi, and cellular
data into a single API for location-based applications [15], hence separat-
ing data from GPS PROVIDER and NETWORK PROVIDER is no longer straight
forward. PL-Protector addresses this issue by preventing app’s location
request to reach the Fused Location Manager that collects and sends
the network session data to the location provider. Instead, the requested
location is retrieved from the on-device cache, and then, it is sent to the
requesting app (with privacy rules applied).
Bootstrapping When PL-Protector first boots and before turning ‘ON’
the location sharing setting, the user will have to perform an initial setup.
This will allow WiFi AP scanning, input geo-coordinates and set privacy
choices using User Interfaces (UI) (Fig. 2 - left). PL-Protector’s UI in-
corporates a map to get the corresponding geo-coordinates so achieving
an effective privacy without affecting the location accuracy. At the same
time, this prevents non-authorised sharing of device’s exact location and
network session data. The UI (Fig. 2 - middle and right) enables users to
set and manage their private locations and apps distinctly.
5 Evaluation
We evaluate PL-Protector in terms of of Quality of Service (QoS), com-
munication and computational overheads.
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Fig. 5. Total response rate by PL-Protector when interacting with apps
5.1 Experimental setup
We deployed PL-Protector middleware on a Nexus 6 with Android 6.0
(API 23) and ported apps of five different LBS queries categories namely
1) Social Networking (e.g., Facebook), 2) Instant Messaging/chatting
(e.g., Whatsapp), 3) Tracking (e.g., Fitness), 4) Utilities (e.g., Weather,
Alarm, etc.) and 5) Finder (PoI Finder/Geo-search). Based on app op-
erations, we assume that both types 1) and 3) require continuous access
to location data; whereas, types 2), 4) and 5) involve sporadic access. We
have collected empirical data from a number of sessions running at differ-
ent time intervals over a period from 1 to 6 months. We then created two
datasets at 34 selected private places. In the first dataset, we include the
ported apps’ session data running over the conventional Android environ-
ment without interacting with PL-Protector. The second dataset consists
of the same apps running in the presence of PL-Protector.
5.2 Impact on the quality of service
Crucial for its functionality, we measure latency as the time PL-Protector
takes to interact with the app and perform an entire computational cycle,
i.e., to compute the location on-device and to apply the privacy rules. On
average, PL-Protector presents a latency lower than 22 milliseconds upon
all the location-access calls executing PL-Protector’s privacy controls at
runtime (as shown in Fig. 3). The reason for increased latency is due
to PL-Protector’s load time, and cross-process/IPC service transfers of
location updates. However, this latency is smaller than 100 ms and, thus,
small enough to not cause user-noticeable delays while utilising apps on
the device. Furthermore, Fig. 4 show the communication overhead for
the 5 app categories and compares both execution environments. In per-
location access sessions, we found< 19ms delays when continuous location
updates, and < 8 ms delay for sporadic location updates. Thus, PL-
Protector is suitable to run all the existing apps of aforementioned five
LBS categories since their core functionality already accepts delays in this
range.
5.3 Cache accuracy
To analyse the accuracy of the on-device cache method at runtime, we
measure cache hits and misses that includes three possible outcomes: 1.
The location is cached and up-to-date, 2. The location is cached but is out-
of-date, and 3. The location is not cached. The total observed response
rates range between 70% to 90% accuracy (Fig. 5) that demonstrates the
suitability of PL-Protector’s on-device location computation process with
types of apps requiring both sporadic and continuous location-updates.
This indicates PL-Protectors’s on-device cache update frequency is within
practical limits, and it provides accurate location data at runtime.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented the design, deployment and evaluation of
PL-Protector, a location privacy-enhancing middleware, which minimises
the interaction and data collection from wireless access points, content
distributors and location providers. The middleware also provides a new
series of control settings to prevent user information disclosure during
formation of LBS queries. PL-Protector enforces these privacy rules over
both the information and control flows occurred between sources and
sinks. We have fully implemented PL-Protector on Android 6 and vali-
dated with real apps from five different LBS queries categories. Experi-
ments demonstrated acceptable delay overheads and within efficient and
practical limits. Immediate future work pursues analysis on the threat
model to read its compliance with the three privacy settings and measure
achieved level of privacy. Additionally, we plan deployment improvements
related to the on-device computation and cache storage, i.e., by incorpo-
rating PL-Protector as a part of an Android custom Read-Only-Memory.
We are also planning to conduct a usability study that will allow us to
enhance PL-Protector’s privacy and usability rates.
References
1. Almuhimedi, H., Schaub, F., Sadeh, N., Others: Your Location has been Shared
5,398 Times! A Field Study on Mobile App Privacy Nudging. In: Procs. of ACM
Conf. on Human Factors in Computing Systems. pp. 787–796. ACM (2015)
2. Amini, S., Lindqvist, J., Hong, J., Lin, J., Toch, E., Sadeh, N.: Cache´: caching
location-enhanced content to improve user privacy. In: Procs. of ACM Int. Conf.
on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services. pp. 197–210. ACM (2011)
3. Android Developer Reference: (March 2016), http://developer.android.com/reference/
4. Ardagna, C.A., Livraga, G., Samarati, P.: Protecting privacy of user information
in continuous location-based services. In: Computational Science and Engineering
(CSE), 2012 IEEE 15th International Conference on. pp. 162–169. IEEE (2012)
5. Beresford, A.R., Rice, A., Skehin, N., Sohan, R.: Mockdroid: trading privacy for
application functionality on smartphones. In: Procs. of ACM Workshop on Mobile
Computing Systems and Applications. pp. 49–54. ACM (2011)
6. Bugiel, S., Heuser, S., Sadeghi, A.R.: Flexible and fine-grained mandatory access
control on android for diverse security and privacy policies. In: Usenix security.
pp. 131–146 (2013)
7. Cranor, L.F., Sadeh, N.: A shortage of privacy engineers. IEEE Security & Privacy
(2), 77–79 (2013)
8. Enck, W., Gilbert, P., Han, S., Tendulkar, V., Chun, B.G., Others: TaintDroid: an
information-flow tracking system for realtime privacy monitoring on smartphones.
TOCS 32(2), 5 (2014)
9. European Commission: Protection of personal data (2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/
10. Faruki, P., Bharmal, A., Laxmi, V., Ganmoor, V., Gaur, M.S., Conti, M., Rajara-
jan, M.: Android security: a survey of issues, malware penetration, and defenses.
IEEE communications surveys & tutorials 17(2), 998–1022 (2015)
11. Fawaz, K., Feng, H., Shin, K.G.: Anatomization and protection of mobile apps’
location privacy threats. In: 24th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security
15). pp. 753–768. USENIX Association (2015)
12. Fawaz, K., Shin, K.G.: Location Privacy Protection for Smartphone Users. In:
Procs. of ACM Conf. on Computer and Comm. Securty. pp. 239–250. ACM (2014)
13. Google Weave: Weave, https://developers.google.com/weave/
14. Guha, S., Jain, M., Padmanabhan, V.N.: Koi: A location-privacy platform for
smartphone apps. In: Procs. of the 9th USENIX conference on Networked Systems
Design and Implementation. pp. 14–14. USENIX Association (2012)
15. Hellman, E.: Android programming: Pushing the limits. John Wiley & Sons (2013)
16. IETF: Geographic Location Privacy (March 2016),
http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/geopriv/charter/
17. Michael, K., Clarke, R.: Location and tracking of mobile devices: U¨berveillance
stalks the streets. Computer Law & Security Review 29(3), 216–228 (2013)
18. Muslukhov, I., Boshmaf, Y., Kuo, C., Lester, J., Beznosov, K.: Understanding
users’ requirements for data protection in smartphones. In: IEEE Int. Conf. on
Secure Data Management on Smartphones and Mobiles. pp. 228–235. IEEE (2012)
19. Niu, B., Li, Q., Zhu, X., Cao, G., Li, H.: Enhancing Privacy through Caching in
Location-Based Services. In: Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM (2015)
20. Patel, A., Palomar, E.: Privacy Preservation in Location-Based Mobile Applica-
tions: Research Directions. In: Procs. of IEEE Int. Conf. on Availability, Reliability
and Security (ARES). pp. 227–233. IEEE (2014)
21. Patel, A., Palomar, E.: LP-Cache´: Privacy-aware cache model for location-based
apps. In: Procs. of the 13th Int. Conf. on Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT).
pp. 183–194 (2016)
22. Pontes, T., Vasconcelos, M., Almeida, J., Kumaraguru, P., Almeida, V.: We know
where you live: Privacy characterization of foursquare behavior. In: Procs. of ACM
Conf. on Ubiquitous Computing. pp. 898–905. ACM (2012)
23. Robusto, C.C.: The cosine-haversine formula. The American Mathematical
Monthly 64(1), 38–40 (1957)
24. Samsung: smartthings, http://www.samsung.com/uk/smartthings/
25. Shklovski, I., Mainwaring, S.D., Sku´lado´ttir, H.H., Others: Leakiness and Creepi-
ness in App Space: Perceptions of Privacy and Mobile App Use. In: Procs. of ACM
Conf. on Human factors in computing systems. pp. 2347–2356. ACM (2014)
26. Wernke, M., Skvortsov, P., Others: A classification of location privacy attacks and
approaches. Personal and Ubiquitous Computing 18(1), 163–175 (2014)
27. Xie, J., Knijnenburg, B.P., Jin, H.: Location sharing privacy preference: analysis
and personalized recommendation. In: Procs. of the 19th Int. Conf. on Intelligent
User Interfaces. pp. 189–198. ACM (2014)
28. Zhu, X., Chi, H., Niu, B., Zhang, W., Li, Z., Li, H.: Mobicache: When k-anonymity
meets cache. In: GLOBECOM. pp. 820–825. IEEE (2013)
